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PERFORMANCE AND POLITICS: AN ARGUMENT FOR
EXPANDED FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF
HOMOSEXUAL EXPRESSION
Jennifer Mineart
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."'
These ten words comprise "the bedrock legal instrument which governs
communication in America."'2 They have spawned a complex jurispru-
dence much belied by the seeming simplicity of the Framers' text. Con-
stitutional scholars seeking to explicate First Amendment law are careful
to qualify their categorizations 3 of "protected" and "unprotected" speech
as ever fluid and replete with subcategories and case-by case exceptions
that render their study a confusing journey through an "endless maze. '" 4
But the maze is not without guideposts. While scholars differ as to the
precise purposes of the First Amendment, 5 all agree that one overarching
goal is to foster free and open debate. Even when the judiciary places
new obstacles in the First Amendment maze to prevent harm to others or
to benefit the collective over the individual good, the goal of free and
open debate remains. The central difficulty of First Amendment juris-
prudence then is not one of defining the endpoint, but of determining
how best to reach it while balancing countervailing interests. 6
t J.D., Cornell Law School, 2001; B.A., University of Maryland, 1993.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 3 (1981).
3 DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 14-15 (1998). HAIMAN, supra note 2, at
4 (Referring to Supreme Court decisions on First Amendment issues Professor Haiman writes,
"To say that those decisions have left something to be desired in terms of consistency, predict-
ability, and logical adequacy would be an understatement."). See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS 757 (1997) ("[I]t is not possible to compre-
hensively flow chart the First Amendment as a defined series of questions... [t]here are many
ways of approaching and evaluating government actions restricting expression.").
4 STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 9 (1990).
5 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 751-56. Professor Chemerinsky divides the various
scholarly approaches into four major categories, emphasizing the importance of First Amend-
ment protection to self-governance, the discovery of truth, the advancement of autonomy and
the promotion of tolerance. See also OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3 (1996)
("Speech is valued so importantly in the Constitution, I maintain, not because it is a form of
self-expression or of self-actualization but rather because it is essential for collective self-
determination."). For analysis of the Framers' intent, see FARBER, supra note 3, at 8-10 (con-
cluding that though the original intent is unclear, the Framers were almost certainly concerned
with the specter of too much centralized power).
6 Fiss, supra note 5, at 5. HAIMAN, supra note 2, at 4 ("[T]hough we have a theoretical
commitment . . . to freedom of expression as a near absolute, reality forces us to recognize
many competing rights and interests that tempt us ... in the direction of restraints.
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Dissenting voices are those most in need of protection and are
among those whose expression our Constitution was most intended to
shield.7 In today's society, homosexuals 8 are perhaps the most perse-
cuted and devalued of dissidents.9 While the shifting sands of First
Amendment doctrine have afforded the homosexual community some
protections, they have also denied protection in areas where it should be
extended. Part I of this note discusses the historical evolution of First
Amendment jurisprudence and its treatment of the free speech claims of
gays and lesbians. Part II critiques one proposal for expanded First
Amendment protection of homosexual expression and then offers an al-
ternative suggestion.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
This note provides a brief sketch of only a few categories of speech
that are traditionally favored or disfavored under our nation's First
Amendment jurisprudence. From this sketch, several patterns emerge.
Speech characterized by its ability to incite others to engage in imminent
illegal conduct or violence typically is not extended the full protection of
the First Amendment.10 Neither do courts look favorably upon speech
that meets the Supreme Court's most recently articulated definition of
obscenity."I Further, "pure speech" is considered more worthy of First
Amendment protection than speech that also contains an element of con-
duct.12 The difficulties inherent in making what are necessarily subjec-
tive determinations within these disfavored categories are perhaps most
7 HAIG A. BOSMAJIAN, DISSENT: SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR AND RHETORICAL STRATEGIES 15
(1972). ("In the United States, under our Constitution, the question is not 'may I dissent?' or
'may I oppose a law or a government?' I may dissent. I may criticize. I may oppose. Our
Constitution and our courts guarantee this."). See also SHIFFRIN, supra note 4, at 88 (describ-
ing the social and political power of the First Amendment as "a shining symbol of a country
that values and protects dissent" that extends beyond its legal force).
8 It has been brought to my attention that some gays and lesbians may be offended by
the use of the terms "homosexual" and "homosexual expression" as they appear throughout
this note. I use these terms not to give offense but for reasons of economy of phrasing and
because "homosexual" is largely the term used in case law to refer to gays and lesbians.
9 Bill Reel, Current Events Tell Us Differences Aren't Funny, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21, 1998,
at A45 (indicating that, though crime in New York City is down generally, crimes against
homosexuals are on the rise); Bettina Boxall, Long Arm of Hatred, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998,
at B2 (describing anti-gay attacks in Los Angeles County and noting that 220 anti-gay inci-
dents were reported within the county in 1997); Jose Martinez, Climate of Fear Haunts Gays,
BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 18, 1998, at 3 (indicating a 42% increase in reports of gay-bashing in
Boston between 1996 and 1997). Not the least among those who persecute homosexuals
through the homophobic structuring of their opinions are the members of the modem judiciary.
See Kendall Thomas, Corpus Juris (Hetero)sexualis: Doctrine, Discourse, and Desire in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, I GLQ 33 (1993), reprinted in WILLIAM K. ESKRIDCE, JR. & NAN D.
HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 66-71 (1997).
10 See infra notes 22-41 and accompanying text.
I I See infra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 59-82 and accompanying text.
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acute when courts, distinguishing pure speech from speech as conduct,
determine whether language is so patently offensive to community stan-
dards as to be obscene. It is in these areas that individual members of the
judiciary are most free to adulterate opinions with their own biases.
Hence, it is not surprising to find that most of the decisions (though cer-
tainly not all) that have stifled homosexual expression characterized the
speech in question as either obscene or merely as "conduct" not worthy
of full First Amendment protection.
With societal prejudices reflected so strongly in decisions concern-
ing disfavored areas of First Amendment protection, we might expect to
see a similar suppression of gay and lesbian expression within categories
of traditionally favored speech. However, the personal biases of certain
members of the Supreme Court notwithstanding, 13 courts have been
fairly consistent in protecting political or performative speech. Thus,
performances of those who cater to predominantly homosexual audiences
may not be prohibited. 14 The government may not prevent gay and les-
bian activists from publishing newspapers or associating freely for pur-
poses of discussing sexual orientation discrimination and/or the raising
of social consciousness. 15 And in some cases, even self-identification as
a homosexual may be constitutionally protected political expression. 16
A. HISTORICALLY UNPROTECTED SPEECH
First Amendment jurisprudence has always recognized the need for
some limits on freedom of speech. 17 Speech that incites illegal activity
or provokes hostility, obscenity, sexually oriented speech, defamatory
speech, conduct (as opposed to verbal speech), commercial speech,
speech by government employees and/or attorneys, and labor protests
typically have not been extended full First Amendment protection. 18
However, speech that might seem to be disfavored under First Amend-
ment analysis may be protected on occasion' 9 just as speech normally
favored may be restricted in certain contexts. 20 In determining whether
First Amendment protection attaches to specific types of speech, courts
13 See infra note 100.
14 See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 109, 115-117 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
17 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 750. ("[T]he Supreme Court never has accepted the
view that the First Amendment prohibits all government regulation of expression.").
18 Id. at 757. See also FARBER, supra note 3.
19 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1983) (sug-
gesting that sleeping on a park bench might be a form of constitutionally protected expression
when done for the purpose of political protest).
20 The most prominent example in this category is the wide latitude given to the military
to violate what might otherwise be constitutionally protected rights. See, e.g., Watson v.
Perry, 918 F.Supp. 1403, 1417 (1996) ("[J]udicial review of military regulations challenged on
2001]
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consider a myriad of factors whose application requires subjective value
judgments that are often fatal to the expression of ideas outside the popu-
lar mainstream. 2' As discussed below, application of these factors has
had the effect of alternately promoting and stifling homosexual
expression.
1. Incitement of Illegal Activity
In deference to the overarching goal of maximizing freedom of ex-
pression, the Supreme Court narrowly defines speech that incites illegal
activity. The leading case in this area is Brandenburg v. Ohio,22 in
which the Supreme Court ruled that a Ku Klux Klan member's racist and
anti-Semitic speech was protected under the First Amendment despite
the fact that it advocated illegal conduct. 23 With this decision, the Court
narrowed its previous holdings on incitement of illegal activity, announc-
ing that a state cannot "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."24
While some courts have held that homosexual expression can con-
stitute imminent incitement to commit what is still (in most states) the
illegal act of "sodomy," most post-Brandenburg decisions have not rec-
ognized this defense to restrictions on homosexual expression. In Gay
Students Organization of the University of New Hampshire v. Bonner,
the University of New Hampshire restricted the activities of a gay stu-
dents' group after a dance sponsored by the group drew negative media
attention to the University.25 Finding in favor of the students, the First
Circuit rejected the University's argument that condoning the group's
activities would promote illegal activity including "'deviate' sex acts,
'lascivious carriage' and breach of the peace."' 26 The court reasoned that
"mere 'undifferentiated fear or apprehension' of illegal conduct, is not
enough to overcome First Amendment rights, and speculation that indi-
viduals might at some time engage in illegal activity is insufficient to
First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or
regulations designed for civilian society.").
21 A detailed discussion of each of the factors considered under First Amendment juris-
prudence is beyond the scope of this note. I will therefore discuss only a few of the many
factors courts consider when determining whether speech should be protected by the First
Amendment. For a detailed treatment of all aspects of First Amendment analysis, see
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 757-1036.
22 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 447.
25 509 F.2d 652, 652-55 (lst Cir. 1974).
26 Id. at 662.
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justify regulation by the state."2 7 Citing Bonner, the Fifth Circuit rebuf-
fed a similar argument made by Texas A&M University as the basis for
denying recognition to a student services organization committed to as-
sisting homosexual students. 28 While a repeal of all sodomy statutes
would certainly be a larger victory for the homosexual community than
an admission that congregated homosexuals are not presumptively poised
to commit "deviant" and illegal sex acts, the favorable application of the
Brandenburg test represented by these circuit court decisions is at least a
partial victory for gay and lesbian rights.
2. Fighting Words
The Supreme Court first delineated the "fighting words" exception
in 1942, excluding from First Amendment protection certain classes of
statements, including "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or fighting words - those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."'29 Such
statements, the Court reasoned, formed "no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the so-
cial interest in order and morality. '3° Subsequent refinements of the
"fighting words" test have narrowed its applicability to only those words
that are directed at a specified target3' and which, given their context, are
unexpected by the listener.32 The most recent authority from the Su-
preme Court on "fighting words" is R.A. V. v. St. Paul, Minnesota,33 in
which the defendant burned a cross on an African-American family's
lawn in violation of a city ordinance banning the display of any symbol
that "arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion, or gender."' 34 The Court held the statute invalid
because it targeted only some "fighting words. ' 35 Thus, in order to con-
27 Id.
28 Gay Student Serv. v. Texas A&M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1328 (5th Cir. 1984). Earlier
cases in the Fifth Circuit, however, did not apply the Brandenburg test with the same rigor. In
Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, an off-campus homosexual group sued a state univer-
sity newspaper editor for refusing to publish a proposed paid advertisement. The Court of
Appeals sustained the judgment for defendant, holding that, since Mississippi condemns "in-
tercourse which is unnatural, detestable and abominable ... [t]he editor of [the newspaper] had
a right to take the position that the newspaper would not be involved, even peripherally, with
this off-campus homosexually-related activity." Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536
F.2d 1073, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1976).
29 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
30 Id. at 572.
31 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
32 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 578 (1972).
33 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
34 Id. at 380.
35 Id. at 391-92.
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stitutionally regulate fighting words, legislatures must draft statutes that
do not distinguish among types of speech based on content.36
Some commentators worry that the subjective determinations judges
must make when applying the fighting words doctrine (i.e., whether the
words form "no essential part of any exposition of ideas") may lead to
discriminatory bars against homosexual expression by a biased judici-
ary. 37 However, courts have tended to use "fighting words" as a shield
for those engaged in "anti-gay" speech rather than as a sword to strike
down provocative forms of homosexual expression. For example, in
State v. Macholz, the Supreme Court of Minnesota determined that the
defendant's anti-gay statements made while riding horseback and alleg-
edly swinging a lead rope through a group of people assembled at a gay
and lesbian celebration were not equivalent to fighting words and there-
fore were protected under the First Amendment. 38 On occasion, how-
ever, the courts have found gay-bashing speech threatening enough to
constitute "fighting words." In People v. Rockiki, the defendant violated
a hate crime statute by screaming epithets at a restaurant server he per-
ceived to be gay. 39 The state court determined that Rockiki's conduct
"exceeded the bounds of spirited debate, and [that] the First Amendment
does not give him the right to harass or terrorize anyone."'40
In addition to using the "fighting words" rationale to both defend
and condemn speech offensive to the homosexual community, courts
have used it to protect certain forms of homosexual expression. An Ohio
appeals court recently overturned a homosexual defendant's conviction
for solicitation of a member of the same sex, in part because "[t]he likeli-
hood that, in these circumstances, appellant's words would incite the av-
erage person to immediate violence is . . . remote."'4' Thus, while the
potential exists for courts to abuse the post-R.A. V. "fighting words" doc-
36 Some commentators have pointed out that drawing statutes non-specific enough to
meet the R.A.V. requirement yet not so amorphous as to be overturned on grounds of over-
breadth or vagueness will be difficult if not impossible. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3 at 820-
21. However, it is worth noting that, one year after R.A.V. was decided, the Supreme Court
upheld a Wisconsin hate crime statute that punished "bias-motivated" conduct rather than the
expression of ideas. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
37 Brent Hunter Allen, The First Amendment and Homosexual Expression: The Need for
an Expanded Interpretation, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1073, 1089-90 (1994).
38 574 N.W.2d 415, 422 (Minn. 1998.) ("In the present case, Machholz made the follow-
ing statements: 'You're giving us AIDS!'; 'You're spreading your filth!'; 'There are no homo-
sexuals in heaven!'; and 'You're corrupting our children!' While we may find these
statements offensive and obnoxious, they do not per se constitute fighting words.")
39 718 N.E.2d 333 (I1l. App. 2d 1999).
40 Id. at 339. See also People v. Dupont, 107 A.D.2d 247, 486 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1985)
(Defendant's conduct in harassing his former attorney by distributing a magazine depicting the
attorney as a homosexual did not amount to "fighting words.").
41 State of Ohio Metroparks v. Lasher, No. 73085, 1999 WL 13971, at 15 (Ohio Ct. App.
8th Jan. 14, 1999).
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trine to the detriment of homosexual speech, present case law indicates a
fairly balanced application that protects speech both celebrating and den-
igrating the homosexual lifestyle.
3. Obscenity
As indicated in the above quote from Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire,42 the Supreme Court does not extend First Amendment protection
to speech it chooses to characterize as lewd or obscene because such
words are deemed incapable of contributing to social discourse.43 In
other words, obscene speech is not really speech. In Roth v. United
States,44 the Supreme Court formalized its condemnation of obscenity,
defining it as "material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interest"45 and further defining prurient as "having a tendency to
excite lustful thoughts."'46 The Court struggled to clarify Roth's subjec-
tive and vague framework for years until, in 1973, it announced the
three-prong test for obscenity that persists to the present day. Material is
considered obscene, and is therefore excluded from First Amendment
protection, if: (1) the average person would find that it appeals to "pruri-
ent interests" in light of "community standards"; (2) it presents "sexual
conduct" in a "patently offensive" manner as defined by "applicable state
law"; and (3) "taken as a whole, [it] lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal or scientific value."'47 Obviously, even this more lucid incantation of
the obscenity test requires courts to make subjective value judgments as
to what material appeals to "prurient interests," what is "patently offen-
sive," and what lacks redeeming value. 48
The majority of case law on the obscenity exception to free speech
involves decisions not to extend protection to books or films which de-
pict explicit sexual acts of either a homosexual or heterosexual nature. 49
42 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
43 Some commentators, such as David Richards, argue that courts should not be in the
business of defining and regulating obscenity at all while others, such as Catherine MacKin-
non, consider state regulation of prurient materials essential to prevent anti-social behaviors
that subordinate women. For a good summary of arguments pro and con the regulation of
obscene materials, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 829-31.
,4 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
45 Id. at 487.
46 Id. at n.20.
47 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).-
48 The Supreme Court's subsequent cases have not been significantly helpful in further
defining these terms. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1973) (declaring that
nudity alone is not enough to make a film "patently offensive" under the Miller standard);
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987) (establishing that the standard for determining
whether allegedly obscene material has redeeming value is that of a reasonable person rather
than a community standard).
49 See e.g., Tipp-It, Inc. v. Conboy, 596 N.W. 2d 304 (Neb. 1999) (holding that photo-
graphs hanging on the wall of a bar and depicting graphic sexual acts were obscene and not
2001]
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However, there have been some instances in which the courts have sin-
gled out modes of homosexual expression that were not sexual in charac-
ter as being "obscene." For example, the Ninth Circuit characterized a
magazine containing an article about a lesbian woman's choice between
denying and embracing her homosexuality as "nothing more than cheap
pornography calculated to promote lesbianism" (as if this were itself "ob-
scene"). The Ninth Circuit further noted that "social standards are fixed
by and for the great majority and not by or for a hardened or weakened
minority. '50 And a Fifth Circuit dissenting judge argued in dicta that a
newspaper might legally refuse to print an advertisement that "expressly
solicited 'unnatural intercourse.' -51 In another case brought by prisoners
challenging the censorship of their mail, the Fifth Circuit held that, while
a prisoner's First Amendment rights should be honored to the extent they
are consistent with the objectives of the penal system, 52 the "legitimate
rehabilitation interest of prison authorities" in preventing homosexual
acts rendered the prison's censorship of magazines depicting homoerotic
acts constitutionally acceptable.5 3 Implicit in each of these decisions is
the assumption that homosexual orientation itself, not just the act of sex,
is "obscene," an indulgence of the "hardened and weakened" minority,
an unnatural deviation from the correct path that requires "rehabilitation"
to fix and definitely not speech (or a lifestyle) the First Amendment
should protect.
Such extreme views have been tempered with some judicial reluc-
tance to draw majoritarian value judgments regarding the relative worth
of speech. For example, some courts have acknowledged that gay and
lesbian expression is protected by the First Amendment, even when such
protected by the First Amendment); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) (upholding the
conviction of an 'adult' bookstore owner for selling an un-illustrated book that explicitly de-
scribed both homosexual and heterosexual sex acts the Court described as "offensive to the
point of being nauseous"); United States v. American Theater Corp., 526 F.2d 48 (8th Cir.
1975) (holding that films depicting both homosexual and heterosexual couples engaged in
sexual acts were not protected by the First Amendment); State v. Downtown Books, Inc. 196
Neb. 473 (Neb. 1976) (upholding conviction of a bookstore owner who sold magazines with
explicit sexual content); Lakin v. United States, 363 A.2d 990 (D.C. 1976) (upholding similar
convictions of bookstore clerk and manager); Sedelbauer v. State, 455 N.E.2d 1159 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983) (while the conviction here was for distribution of a homoerotic film, the applicable
obscenity statute banned distribution of films depicting heterosexual sex acts as well). But see
Calderon v. City of Buffalo, 397 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1977) (striking an obscenity statute prohibit-
ing sales displays of sexually explicit material without regard to content as unconstitutionally
overbroad).
50 One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772, 777 (9th Cir., 1957). Though the Supreme Court
subsequently overruled this decision, it serves as a reminder of the power with which the
obscenity doctrine vests the courts to determine the members of the "majority" and the "hard-
ened or weakened minority."
51 Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1078, n.6 (5th Cir. 1976).
52 See Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 760 (5th Cir. 1978).
53 Id. at 762.
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expression may be "distasteful to the majority."54 The Supreme Court
has prohibited regulation of private tastes by distinguishing between pub-
lic distribution of obscene materials and private possession, holding that
the state cannot regulate the latter.55 Further, some courts have held that
the viewpoints of gays and lesbians themselves may be admitted into
evidence as a way of gauging the community's standards of "prurient
interest" under the Miller test, thus at least acknowledging that homosex-
uals are a part of the legal community whose views matter when deter-
mining what speech should and should not be constitutionally valued.56
Justice Douglas even argued that idea-laden speech should not be regu-
lated at all.5 7 In a dissenting opinion from 1966, Justice Douglas rea-
soned that
the First Amendment allows all ideas to be ex-
pressed - whether orthodox, popular, offbeat, or repul-
sive. I do not think it permissible to draw lines between
the 'good' and the 'bad' and be true to the constitutional
mandate to let all ideas alone....
Government does not sit to reveal where the 'truth'
is. People are left to pick and choose between compet-
ing offerings... [and] we have no business acting as cen-
sors or endowing any group with censorship powers.5 8
Justice Douglas seems to have acknowledged the judiciary as an
inappropriate arbiter of morality. However, the cases cited above reflect
a disturbing tendency of too many judges to act in just this capacity. As
determinations of obscenity are among the most subjective in First
Amendment jurisprudence, they are likely the ones most susceptible to
abuse and, therefore, among the most dangerous to those who wish to
safeguard gay and lesbian expression.
54 Norma Kristie, Inc. v. Oklahoma City, 572 F.Supp.88, 92 (W.D. Okla. 1983) (holding
that the First Amendment required that plaintiff, a corporation seeking to stage the "Miss Gay
America" pageant, be allowed to lease space in an Oklahoma City Convention Center).
55 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) ("Whatever the power of the state to
control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally
premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts.").
56 United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 834-835 (11 th Cir. 1982) (upholding the use
of testimony from a gay pastor at a predominantly homosexual church as to the Miami homo-
sexual community's standards regarding pornography and whether certain sexually explicit
films would be considered arousing to the prurient interest).
57 See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 491-92 (1966) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
58 Id. It is worth noting that this case involved censorship of advertisements that em-
ployed "sex symbols" to sell products. Id.
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4. Conduct
Another way in which jurists can deny First Amendment protection
to speech whose value they find questionable is to characterize the
speech as conduct. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has afforded
greater protections to acts defined as "pure speech" than acts that include
some element of conduct, or "speech plus." Thus, in drawing the line
between "speech" and "conduct," courts subjectively decide which
speech/acts merit First Amendment protection and which do not.59
The majority of the Supreme Court first made reference to a distinc-
tion between speech and conduct in Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, where
it declared picketing to be "speech plus" that could be regulated by the
state. 60 While no real basis for the distinction between "speech" and
"speech plus" has been set forth,6' there are certain areas in which
speech and conduct are inevitably intertwined but the message conveyed
by the combined speech and conduct is political in nature or representa-
tive of a minority viewpoint. In these instances, courts will almost inva-
riably afford the speech/conduct some form of First Amendment
protection.62 However, as Professor Tribe points out, "[a]ll that follows
is that the government must meet some version of the least restrictive test
- a relaxed version. . .when the Court does not deem the activities in
question particularly significant to the system of free expression. When
the conduct is more closely linked to the expression ... a tighter version
of the test is appropriate. ' 63
The series of legal challenges to the U.S. military's "don't ask,
don't tell" policy dramatically exemplifies the effects that the speech/
conduct dichotomy can have on homosexual expression. The current
controversial policy on homosexuality within the U.S. military is only
the latest manifestation of a deeply entrenched discrimination against
gays in military service dating back to the Revolutionary War.64 To
serve in the military today, a gay or lesbian service-member must refrain
from engaging in homosexual "conduct" and must also refrain from mak-
ing any statements that suggest a "propensity" to engage in "homosexual
conduct."65 Such statements raise a rebuttable presumption that can lead
59 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 826-27 (2d ed. 1988) (Profes-
sor Tribe discusses the problems associated with separating speech from conduct and, in foot-
note 7, notes Kalven's criticism of "the distinction between speech and conduct serving as a
sub rosa tool to escape the rigidity of the absolutist position so as to produce the desired
result.").
60 See Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 289, 290, 292 (1957).
61 See TRIBE, supra note 59, at 827.
62 See id. at 829-32.
63 Id. at 832.
64 See EsKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 9, at 366-407.
65 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1995).
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to discharge from the military "if the member fails to demonstrate that he
or she in fact does not engage in homosexual acts and is not likely to do
so."
'66 Courts have upheld this policy's constitutionality in the face of
numerous challenges. 67 In one case filed the day after the Navy imple-
mented Department of Defense directives to carry out the new policy,68
Lt. Paul Thomasson argued, inter alia, that the policy violated his First
Amendment right to free speech by making his verbal acknowledgement
of homosexuality alone, rather than any conduct, the basis for his dis-
charge. In rejecting this argument, the court emphasized that the reason
for his discharge was not his speech alone but rather speech (i.e. his
admission of being a homosexual) combined with an "entirely reasonable
presumption that as a homosexual he will engage in homosexual con-
duct .... Thus, the basis for separation is acts and the likelihood of acts,
not 'speech." 69 This reasoning is difficult to understand. First the court
links speech to conduct by indicating that the former establishes a pre-
sumption of the latter. Then, the court says that conduct alone, or its
likelihood, is the basis for discharge. However in this case, there is no
conduct to serve as the basis for Thomasson's discharge but only the
"likelihood" of prohibited conduct and that itself is only established be-
cause of a presumption attached to the plaintiff's own speech. The link
between conduct and speech here is hardly attenuated. If speech does
not become conduct as Thomasson alleges, it at least stands in for con-
duct, for the only reason Thomasson was discharged was because of his
statement. There simply was no "conduct" to punish other than the state-
ment. The court's perplexing reasoning may reflect a tension between its
desire to both defer to the military70 and yet remain true to the principles
of free speech. Better to characterize the discharge as based on conduct,
traditionally not accorded much constitutional protection, than to admit
that the military's policy in fact is designed to punish either speech (pro-
fessions of homosexual orientation) or conduct (homosexual acts).
66 Id.
67 The military's prior policy on homosexuality, which did not significantly differ from
the present one, has also been upheld as constitutional. See Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160
(9th Cir. 1991) (In a newspaper article, plaintiff, an army reserve officer, acknowledged being
a lesbian. The court rejected her First Amendment challenge, holding that plaintiff's discharge
was based not upon her speech but upon her "being a homosexual."); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,
881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding military dismissal based upon the act of identifi-
cation as a homosexual though speaking about homosexuality in itself alone would be pro-
tected by the First Amendment).
68 See Thomasson v. Perry, 895 F.Supp. 820, 823 (E.D.Va. 1995).
69 Id. at 825.
70 The Thomasson court gave a nod to the Supreme Court's recognition that "the judici-
ary's 'review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more def-
erential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian
society.'" Id. (citation omitted).
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Other courts have exhibited similar difficulties in reconciling the
First Amendment with the military's policy but have ultimately validated
"don't ask, don't tell" as constitutional. In Able v. United States, a group
of six lesbian and gay service members challenged the policy in federal
district court.71 The court concluded that statements professing homo-
sexuality contain both speech and "nonspeech" elements, reasoning that
the statement itself is speech but it is also an act of identification and can
thus be regulated in deference to a "sufficiently important governmental
interest." z72 The district court went on to hold that the military's policy
violated the First Amendment because it amounted to content-based cen-
sorship of speech that subjects members of the military to discharge "re-
gardless of whether they have engaged in or demonstrated a likelihood of
engaging in prohibited acts." 73
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit disagreed with the district
court's First Amendment ruling.74 Noting the need for deference to mili-
tary policies and the "substantial government interest" 75 to be served in
banning homosexual conduct, the Second Circuit accepted the argument
that had won the government's case in Thomasson, i.e., that "don't ask/
don't tell" does not burden speech at all but rather "the Act burdens ho-
mosexual conduct and only uses the speech as evidence that tends to
prove homosexual conduct. ' 76 The case was then remanded to the dis-
trict court for further consideration of whether a ban on homosexual con-
duct itself violates the Constitution.77 Accordingly, the district court
then denounced the military's policy as unconstitutional on equal protec-
tion grounds, holding that "the private prejudices of heterosexual service
members are illegitimate reasons for government-sanctioned discrimina-
tion against gay and lesbian service members. 78 On appeal again, the
Second Circuit reversed, finding that the military's stated objectives of
promoting unit cohesion, enhancing privacy, and reducing sexual tension
71 847 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
72 Id. at 1041.
73 Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
74 Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996).
75 Id. at 1295-96.
76 Id. at 1293.
77 Id. at 1300.
78 Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). In an impassioned
plea for an end to gay and lesbian discrimination, Judge Nickerson wrote, "[a] court should ask
itself what it might be like to be a homosexual. For the United States government to require
those self-identifying as homosexuals to hide their orientation and to pretend to be heterosexu-
als is to ask them to accept a judgment that their orientation is in itself disgraceful and they are
unfit to serve. To impose such a degrading and deplorable condition for remaining in the
Armed Services cannot in fairness be justified on the ground that the truth might arouse the
prejudice of their fellow members."
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were enough to survive rational basis scrutiny and overcome the equal
protection challenge.79
But it is not only the military that may dismiss employees on the
basis of sexual orientation. Other employers have also been permitted to
discriminate against lesbians and gays with constitutional impunity.
Steven Childers, for example, was denied employment in the property
department of the Dallas Police Department "at least in part because of
his gay activist activities."'80 Using language eerily reminiscent of the
Second Circuit's rationale in Able, the court held that the Dallas Police
Department had not violated Childers' constitutional rights since open
homosexuality "undermines the legitimate needs of obedience and disci-
pline within the police department. ' 81 The court reasoned that since a
homosexual employee's "gay activities would have promoted unrest and
disharmony among his co-workers," the police department was more
than justified in refusing employment to an openly gay man. 82
Thus, First Amendment case law provides an alarming amount of
latitude for stifling gay and lesbian expression by empowering courts to
define what "expression" is; conduct may be unprotected if the court
feels that it does not merit protection. We see in the military cases and in
the Childers case a consistent pattern of denying First Amendment pro-
tection to gays and lesbians the moment they declare their homosexual-
ity. Such statements are not statements in the eyes of the courts but acts
unworthy of constitutional protection. 83
However, even assuming, as we really ought not do, that the charac-
terization of such statements as conduct is logically correct, surely there
is room within First Amendment jurisprudence for the safeguarding of
certain types of conduct when it is deemed sufficiently political or ex-
pressive of a minority viewpoint. In a judicial universe where the act of
sleeping on a park bench outdoors may be considered a form of political
protest against homelessness, 84 where the act of distributing leaflets is
constitutionally defensible, 85 and where the act of a civil rights boycott is
79 Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634 (2d Cir. 1998).
80 Childers v. Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134, 139 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
81 Id. at 142.
82 Id. The court distinguished this case of "publicly advocating homosexuality" from
other cases where homosexual persons were refused employment on the basis of privately
practiced homosexuality. Evidently, the court did not find any equal protection or other con-
stitutional problems with sanctioning discrimination against vocal homosexuals but not against
those who remain closeted.
83 See JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 128
(1997) ("To claim that certain speech is not speech and, therefore, not subject to censorship is
already to have exercised the censor.").
84 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
85 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147
(1939).
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protected as social activism,8 6 why is it that the act of identifying oneself
as a homosexual is not protected conduct? If we grant First Amendment
scrutiny and protection to acts that constitute expression of a disfavored
position, 87 why would we not recognize in a courtroom what is sadly true
outside of it, that homosexuality is a "disfavored" life choice in today's
society, one whose advocates are persecuted every day? 88
Courts today, with rare exceptions, merely nod in the direction of
the need for heightened First Amendment protection homosexual expres-
sion. They acknowledge that homosexuals are persecuted for speaking
out and they concede the implication of First Amendment issues but then
find some way to rationalize extending less protection to gay and lesbian
expression than to other forms of speech (e.g., "it's obscene" or "it's
conduct, not speech."). Thus, in the disfavored categories of First
Amendment protection, expression by gays and lesbians is often more
disfavored than other types of expression.
B. HISTORICALLY PROTECTED SPEECH
Having examined several areas of disfavored speech, I will now dis-
cuss two areas of speech the First Amendment is most designed to pro-
tect, or those categories of speech within which courts are least likely to
tolerate restrictions. Legal commentators, as well as the Supreme Court,
have declared the "central meaning" of the First Amendment to be "a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open." 89 Justice Brandeis
viewed freedom of speech as "indispensable to the discovery and spread
of political truth." 90 Of course, political speech is not the only form of
speech that is protected and for this reason, some argue that the politi-
cally based theory of the First Amendment is a hollow one. 91 However,
there can be no doubt that if the First Amendment was not designed to
protect only political speech, it was certainly designed to protect prima-
rily political speech. For that reason, if for no other, courts are reluctant
to censor speech that can reasonably be characterized as political. Full
86 NAACP v. Claiborn Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
87 TRIBE, supra note 59, at 827-28.
88 See supra note 9.
89 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 273 (1964). This politically-
centered view of the First Amendment harmonized perfectly with that of contemporary com-
mentators who likewise felt that "the principle of freedom of speech ... is a deduction from
the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage." AL-
EXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960).
90 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
91 See SmFFRrN, supra note 4, at 49 ("Either a politically based theory excludes speech
such as literature which virtually everyone (including the Founders) agrees is deserving of
protection, or, by making adjustments to include such speech, it is unable to justify a stopping
point.").
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First Amendment protection is also generally accorded to art and litera-
ture, including live performances, films and photographic exhibitions.92
1. Performance
In light of the societal and jurisprudential trends mentioned thus far,
the case law on performance issues under the First Amendment yields
few surprises. As we might expect, nude dancing and pornographic stag-
ing, films and/or literature depicting heterosexual, bisexual or homosex-
ual sex acts are not accorded First Amendment protection 93 although
there have been some interesting variations on this theme.94 Among the
more interesting are those cases which denounce sexually explicit per-
formance as obscene while at the same time conveying a particular dis-
taste for homosexual sex acts. 95 In so doing, individual members of the
judiciary simply reveal the bias toward gays and lesbians so prevalent in
the rest of society. Nonetheless, while it may consider performances of
homosexual sex acts to be more obscene than those of heterosexual sex
acts, the judiciary has consistently and repeatedly refused to extend
heightened First Amendment protection to sexual performance of any
flavor and seems unlikely to alter this view anytime soon.
The courts have been more hesitant to withdraw First Amendment
protection from other types of performance despite their designation as
"obscene" or "offensive." The Supreme Court, for example, required the
city of Chatanooga to allow a performance of "Hair" to proceed in its
municipal theater, holding that the city's ban on the musical was an un-
constitutional prior restraint on free expression. 96 The Fourth Circuit
prohibited censorship of a police officer who performed an Al Jolson
routine in "blackface" at a local tavern while off-duty, despite the fact
that such performances were offensive to African-Americans in the com-
munity in which the officer served.97 A California court refused to im-
pose damages upon Ozzy Osborne's record label when a nineteen-year-
92 Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
93 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Curtis v. City of Seattle,
639 P.2d 1370 (Wash. 1982); Misleh v. State, 799 P.2d 631 (Ct. Crim. App. Okla. 1990).
94 See, e.g., Midtown Palace, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 229 N.W. 2d 56, 59 (Neb. 1975)
(upholding revocation of a liquor license based on nude dancing, yet noting that nude dancing
per se is not "obscene"); People v. Bercowitz, 308 N.Y.S. 2d 1, 15 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970)
(Schwalf, J., dissenting) (arguing that an off-off Broadway production replete with both homo-
sexual and heterosexual sex acts, cannot be found constitutionally "obscene" because the play
"presented ideas").
95 See, e.g., Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (referring to
photographs of lesbian "homosexual activities" as "deviant" and employing the use of a psy-
chiatrist to attest to the "prurient interests of Lesbians"); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502,
505 (distinguishing "normal heterosexual relations" from "such deviations as . . .
homosexuality").
96 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
97 Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985).
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old, inspired by Osborne's lyrics, committed suicide. 98 The court rea-
soned that "[tihe deterrent effect of subjecting the music and recording
industry to such liability because of their programming choices would
lead to a self-censorship which would dampen the vigor and limit the
variety of artistic expression." 99
Publicly funded performances pose special First Amendment
problems. The Supreme Court has remained deferential to First Amend-
ment principles while acknowledging the practical impossibility of grati-
fying every applicant for arts funding. 100 The Court seems to struggle
with reconciling the inevitable subjectivity of a selection process that
must deny funding to some applicants with the potential for unfair ma-
nipulation of selection criteria that could lead to suppression of minority
viewpoints.' 0' However, where the issue was one of allocating the re-
sources of a private funding entity, the Court had no problem upholding
the private entity's discriminatory decisions. In Hurley v. Irish-Ameri-
can Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, the Court found that
forcing a private St. Patrick's Day parade sponsor to allow a group of
Irish-American gays and lesbians to march in the parade would violate
the First Amendment rights of the sponsors to choose the content of the
communication they sought to convey through their event.10 2
The courts have generally afforded constitutional protection to per-
formances promoting or supporting homosexuality. In Cinevision v. City
of Burbank, the Ninth Circuit unabashedly denied the city of Burbank the
98 McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App.3d 989 (1988).
99 Id. at 1003.
100 For example, in subduing a facial First Amendment challenge to the subjective selec-
tion criteria for the National Endowment of the Arts, the Supreme Court cautioned that "[i]f
the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a
penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a different case. We have stated
that, even in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not 'aim at the suppression of
dangerous ideas."' Nat'l Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 2178 (1998),
quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983).
Frighteningly, Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion in this case, had no problem explicitly
stating what the majority did not - that denying NEA funds to "indecent and disrespectful art"
is perfectly acceptable under the Constitution. Id. at 2182-83. Scalia describes the recent
artistic endeavors of the plaintiffs, two of whom use monologues to express their personal
experiences as homosexuals. While Justice Scalia's opinion is disturbing, a reading of the
majority's opinion does not confirm his assertions. Were one of the plaintiffs in this case to
have been denied funding solely because that person's chosen form of expression represented
a minority viewpoint, the majority makes it clear that funding decision would be a ". . press-
ing constitutional question" to which the Court would give serious consideration. Id. at 2178.
lOi Id. at 2177, 2178. See also Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (lst Cir.
1976) (grappling with these same concerns with regard to a grant refusal of a literary magazine
that a state Governor determined to be "obscene").
i02 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
572-73 (1995). Interestingly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts did find in favor of
the marchers, reasoning that the First Amendment rights of the parade organizers would not be
violated since the parade had no real expressive purpose. Id. at 563.
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right to ban certain rock groups' concerts "because members of the [Bur-
bank City] Council thought that their performances would attract homo-
sexual crowds." 10 3 The court's words were a welcome endorsement of
openness and tolerance: "Excluding a performer because of his [sic] po-
litical view, or those of the crowd that he [sic] might attract, or because
the performer might say unorthodox things, as well as considering such
arbitrary factors as the lifestyle or race of the crowd that a performer
would attract, is not constitutionally permissible." 104 Neither does the
First Amendment permit subjective judgments of the performative value
of gay and lesbian expression to stifle that expression. 105
2. Political Speech
As mentioned above, the category of political speech, or speech that
relates to public issues, may be expanded to include speech that might
not appear expressly political but which nonetheless "contribute(s) to the
sophistication and wisdom of the electorate." 10 6 The Supreme Court has
given content to this idea. In holding that wearing a jacket inscribed with
the words "Fuck the Draft" was protected by the First Amendment, 0 7
the Court described freedom of expression as
...putting the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope
that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more
capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the be-
lief that no other approach would comport with the pre-
mise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests. 10 8
Federal and state courts have remained true to this approach in large
part, protecting even unpopular or minority viewpoints (like those of
gays and lesbians) whose expression is deemed in any way to be politi-
cal. For example, homosexual expression in the press has been extended
103 Cinevision v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 576 (9th Cir. 1984).
104 Id. at 577.
105 Norma Kristie, Inc. v. City of Oklahoma City, 572 F. Supp. 88, 91 (W.D. Okla. 1983)
(ordering defendants to allow the "Miss Gay America Pageant" to proceed in their hall over
objections that the pageant was not an artistic endeavor. "Such judgment is subjective. While
this Court may agree that such a 'pageant' may not rise to the level of artistic endeavor that
'Hair' or 'La Cage aux Folles' represent, it is still expression. Defendants have failed to
produce evidence, authority or argument that evaluations of the degree of 'art' in entertainment
make a difference in the extent of constitutional protection. The First Amendment is not an art
critic.").
106 TRIBE, supra note 59, at 787.
107 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 17 (1971).
108 Id. at 24.
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First Amendment protection as a form of political speech. 109 A "Gay
Liberation Special" featured in a newspaper was protected "expression of
political and social opinion" even where the publication also contained
nude photographs of men and "discussion of sexual activity."" 0  Other
courts have held that educators may not be fired for statements made to
the press in support of homosexuality."' In some cases, the expression
of homosexual status itself has been acknowledged as a political state-
ment worthy of First Amendment protection." 12 For example, the Mary-
land district court held that a homosexual teacher's employment status
could not be altered on the basis of his self-identification as a homosex-
ual, opining that "the time has come today for private, consenting, adult
homosexuality to enter the sphere of constitutionally protectable inter-
ests."113 Another district court held that a homosexual high school se-
109 It is important to note, however, that such protections only extend to printed speech
when the denial of protection constitutes state action. See Sinn v. The Daily Nebraskan, 829
F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1987) (denying First Amendment protection to plaintiffs advertising for
roommates when a university newspaper refused to print their sexual orientation on the ground
that the newspaper's refusal was not "state action").
IO Kois v. Breier, 312 F.Supp. 19, 24 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
111 Aumiller v. Univ. of Delaware, 434 F. Supp.1273 (D.Del. 1977). In this case, a non-
tenured lecturer had been fired from his position at the University of Delaware based upon
statements he made in support of homosexuality that had been published in three newspapers.
The court reasoned that "the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment is to protect from
State abridgement the free expression of controversial and unpopular ideas." Id. at 1301. The
court did concede that the University of Delaware could have surmounted the constitutional
hurdle had it demonstrated that Aumiller's statements in support of homosexuality were false
or recklessly made, impeded his job performance, violated an express need for confidentiality,
etc. Nonetheless, the fact that the court did not seize upon any of the University's arguments
in these areas when they might have done so speaks volumes.
112 But see Tester v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 7972 (LMM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1937 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1997) (holding that a gay police officer's First Amendment claim
based upon repeated harassment by fellow officers could not be sustained because the "mere
fact of Tester's sexual status does not constitute expression"). Interestingly, some courts are
loath to extend First Amendment protection to those who express opposition to homosexual
status. See Lumpkin v. Brown, 109 F.3d 1498 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding the removal from
the San Francisco Human Rights Commission of a conservative Reverend who had publicly
advocated against homosexuality: "the First Amendment does not assure him job security
when he preaches homophobia while serving as a City official charged with the responsibility
of 'eliminatfing] prejudice and discrimination'") Id. at 1500.
113 Acanfora v. Board of Ed., 359 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D.Md. 1973). Apparently, however,
in 1973 the time had not come to allow open endorsement of homosexuality on national televi-
sion. The court held that, while Acanfora's transfer was inappropriate, so was his response of
taking "his case to the people" by appearing on several television and radio shows to protest
the injustice of his treatment by the school board. Id. at 856. However, the court was careful
to note that "if private, consenting adult homosexuality is 'protectable,' it follows from the
First Amendment that public speech, organization and assembly in support of that goal by
ordinary citizens is also protectable." Id. at 854. Nonetheless, the court felt that, as a teacher,
Acanfora was "not at liberty to ignore or hold in contempt the sensitivity of the subject to the
school community" and therefore should have restrained his public protests to the minimum
necessary to his self-defense. Id. at 856-57. In this respect, the court seems to want to have its
cake and eat it too, i.e., recognize the right to speak out on homosexuality but only in limited
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nior had a First Amendment right to attend the senior prom with a
member of the same sex since this would be a "political statement."1 14
The right of gays and lesbians to associate for purposes of political advo-
cacy is also protected by the First Amendment. Universities, for exam-
ple, must recognize "'pro-homosexual' political organization[s]
advocating a liberalization of legal restrictions against the practice of ho-
mosexuality"' 15 and may not impinge upon the right of association of
such groups because they "represent but another example of the associa-
tional activity unequivocally singled out for protection in the very 'core'
of association cases decided by the Supreme Court."' 16 Governmental
agencies must likewise protect the rights of homosexuals to associate. In
Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Committee, Inc. v. United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service, a California district court overturned the INS
policy of excluding homosexual aliens from visiting the United States in
order to attend a gay rights advocacy event in San Francisco. 17 The
right of expressive association can also cut the other way: the supreme
court of New Jersey, for example, has held that the inclusion of gays and
lesbians within a group that would prefer to exclude them does not vio-
late the group members' First Amendment rights."18
circumstances. Still, the court did acknowledge First Amendment protection for the status of
homosexuality itself as a necessary component of the freedom of thought "imperative for self-
development and social progress." Id. at 850. But see Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch.
Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1984) (denying First Amendment protection to a bisexual
teacher who admitted her sexual orientation to several colleagues and was then fired). Ironi-
cally, in Rowland, the court rejected the First Amendment argument because the plaintiff's
comments were not a matter of "public concern." Id. at 449. Yet when Mr. Acanfora at-
tempted to make the issue one of public concern by speaking out in the media, that speech was
deemed constitutionally disfavored for lack of discreetness. See also Nat'l Gay Task Force v.
Board of Ed. of Okla. City, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984) (upholding a state statute permit-
ting the dismissal of public school teachers for "public homosexual conduct"). Note that, in
each of these instances, the courts might have construed any statements or conduct regarding a
homosexual or bisexual orientation as constitutionally protected political speech.
114 Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381, 385 (D.R.I. 1980).
115 Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 164 (4th Cir. 1976). See also
Gay Student Services v. Texas A&M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984); Gay Lesbian
Bisexual Alliance v. Sessions, 917 F. Supp. 1558 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
116 Gay Students Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 660 (1st Cir. 1974).
117 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982). The court recognized the event's purposes of
sharing "information and ideas relating to the laws and attitudes regarding homosexuality in
other countries" with a view toward gaining "greater public acceptance for homosexual per-
sons in the United States" as "well-recognized and compelling First Amendment arguments."
Id. at 587.
118 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1223 (N.J. 1999) (holding that the pres-
ence of a homosexual Boy Scout leader did not violate the organization's right to freedom of
association because "members do not associate for the purpose of disseminating the belief that
homosexuality is immoral"). But see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that compelling a private group to permit
Irish-American homosexuals to march in their parade would impose an unconstitutional con-
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The judiciary's record on protecting the political speech of gays and
lesbians is far from perfect but, overall, it is much better than the degree
to which First Amendment protection is extended to many other areas of
speech. It is also important to remember that political speech is not uni-
versally protected with regard to other groups either. While burning a
flag in times of peace may be protected speech,1 19 burning a draft card in
times of war is not.120 Nudity may be constitutionally protected as a
form of artistic expression, yet not all jurisdictions will tolerate it as a
form of political protest. 12
The above picture of First Amendment jurisprudence confirms the
obvious. Gay and lesbian expression is most likely to be sublimated
when the court can relegate it to a subjectively determined category of
disfavored speech and it is most likely to be defended when identified as
political or performative in nature. In light of these realities, the strategy
for widening the constitutional shield of gay and lesbian expression must
appear equally obvious - get more courts to recognize homosexual ex-
pression as political or performative more often. A simple goal, but how
does one guide it through the maze of First Amendment jurisprudence?
PART II: A MODEST PROPOSAL
A. REJECTING A NEW STANDARD OF REVIEW
At least one other commentator has suggested that the key to ex-
panded protection for homosexual expression lies in revising the stan-
dard of review for First Amendment claims.' 22 Brent Hunter Allen
argues for a "hybrid" objective and subjective standard that would pro-
tect the speech of the counter-majority by forcing courts to "value those
views as the speaker values them."'' 23 He feels that forcing the judiciary
to analyze the quality of expressive speech from the point of view of the
gay or lesbian speaker will lead to faster and more effective progress in
the constitutional shielding of that speech. 124 The subjective component
of Hunter Allen's standard (i.e., examining the expression from the ex-
presser's point of view) would be balanced by an objective analysis:
courts would be free to assess the available alternatives to the chosen
tent-based restriction on the expression the private group sought to promote). See supra note
102 and accompanying text.
119 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1989).
120 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
121 State v. Turner, 382 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding defendant's con-
viction for violating a public nudity statute as a valid exercise of police power to uphold
societal norms despite the fact that defendant appeared publicly topless as a form of political
protest).
122 Brent Hunter Allen, supra note 37, at 1103-04.
123 Id. at 1103.
124 Id.
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form of expression and deny protection to "fringe forms of expression"
where they could be "communicated as effectively in a more traditional
form."1 25 The court would thus retain discretion to determine what ex-
pression is, what "fringe expression" is, and how such messages would
best be conveyed. In practice then, Hunter Allen's "hybrid standard"
might be better termed a "reasonable homosexual" standard in that, if the
court feels that a "reasonable homosexual" would express herself in a
form other than that at issue, it may deny the speech protection. 126
Understood in this way, I find Hunter Allen's approach unsatisfying
for the same reasons others have found the "reasonable woman" standard
in sexual harassment cases to be ineffective and even harmful to wo-
men.127 In assessing whether the individual might have pursued a more
"traditional" avenue of expression, Hunter Allen invites a judiciary com-
posed of predominantly white, heterosexual men to develop a set of gen-
eralizations about the appropriate limits of expression for the reasonable
homosexual. But how would these generalizations be made? Would the
courts consult "expert witnesses" on homosexuality as they consult med-
ical experts or others who have specialized knowledge outside of the
judiciary's realm of experience? Who would such experts be? Psychol-
ogists? Psychiatrists? More likely the courts would apply their own con-
ceptions of the "reasonable homosexual" which would more often than
not be based on an individual judge's understanding of the community's
standards of reasonableness, rather than personal experience as a gay or
lesbian individual.' 28 But whether the judge applies his or her own point
of view or that of an "expert," the same problem ensues. The "reasona-
ble homosexual" standard generalizes and limits the expressive possibili-
ties for a group of people for whom "reasonable" expression takes on a
variety of forms. In effect, it essentializes homosexual expression. 129
Allen's proposal thus risks further enshrining existing biases and
prejudices against the gay and lesbian community as "reasonable" and
provides judges with additional ammunition to legally enforce the closet-
125 Id. at 1104.
126 Hunter Allen argues that the objective prong of his test be used to determine only if
alternative forms of the expression existed rather than to judge their reasonableness. Id. How-
ever, in assessing the alternatives to "coming out," for example, a court might be free to
determine that an alternative forum to "coming out" publicly at work might be "coming out" at
a private dinner party in one's home, thus effectively branding the former mode of expression
"unreasonable" and the latter "reasonable."
127 Kathryn Abrams, Social Construction, Roving Biologism, and Reasonable Women: A
Response to Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1021, 1032-37 (1992).
128 Id. at 1033 (indicating a similar problem with judges applying the "reasonable wo-
man" standard to sexual harassment claims since "the vast majority of federal judges hearing
sexual harassment claims are white males").
129 Id. at 1035 (describing the critique of the "reasonable woman" standard as "falsely
essentializ[ing] women").
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ing and covering of homosexuality. Will holding the hand of a same-sex
partner while walking down the street be considered protected speech or
deemed an "unreasonable" alternative to confining such displays of af-
fection to the home? 130 How about the expressive act of "coming out?"
As discussed above, at present, the act of "coming out" in the military is
denied constitutional protection in part because it is considered conduct
rather than pure speech.131 Would a "reasonable homosexual" come out
only privately among friends rather than at work? Allowing courts to
make such decisions would invest them with too much power to super-
impose the majority viewpoint onto the counter-majority. Application of
Allen's hybrid standard by today's judiciary, serving as it does as a mi-
crocosmic reflection of the biases and partialities of society as a whole,
will not result in greater protection of gay and lesbian expression.
B. EVERYTHING OLD CAN BE NEW AGAIN: RE-EXAMINING EXISTING
FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS
Rather than asking judges to apply a new standard of review that
remains infused with the subjectivity of the old, I propose a re-characteri-
zation of complaints within existing First Amendment jurisprudence so
as to remind the judiciary that application of the existing standard of
review requires that First Amendment protection be afforded to many
forms of lesbian and gay expression. As indicated earlier, courts gener-
ally are most receptive to homosexual (or any other type of) expression
that is performative or political in nature. But what courts have failed to
recognize in most cases is that "homosexuality is today essentially a
form of political, social, and moral dissent on par with the best American
traditions and even subversive advocacy."' 132 As such, almost every act
for which a homosexual individual might seek First Amendment protec-
tion, from holding the hand of a same-sex partner to publishing an edito-
rial denouncing "gay-bashing," is a form of political expression.
Furthermore, most of those same acts can also be characterized as
performative. Just as we all may be said to "perform" the "gender
roles"'133 assigned to us, so too do homosexuals "perform" their sexual
orientation. And every gay or lesbian person who boldly "performs" his
130 This hypothetical was mentioned in Hunter Allen's article as a "criticism of society's
sexual beliefs and expectations . . . an assault on those who condemn the gay lifestyle..
Brent Hunter Allen, supra note 37, at 1102.
131 See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
132 Brent Hunter Allen, supra note 37, at 1074.
133 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 134-
141 (1990). Sarah Chinn points out that Butler later attempted to distinguish gender perform-
ances from theatrical productions. See Sarah E. Chinn, Gender Performativity, in LESBIAN
AND GAY STUDIES, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (Andy Medhurst & Sally R. Munt, eds., 1997).
Nonetheless, I do not think Butler would quarrel with a characterization of gender performance
as a political statement if not a theatrical one.
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or her sexual orientation launches a personal attack on the heterosexual
norm as well as on the stereotypical perceptions of homosexuality. Such
performances are no less performances than those put on at the "Miss
Gay America pageant"' 34 and no less political statements than a "Gay
Liberation Special"' 135 published in a newspaper. Because the performa-
tive element of homosexual expression is so inextricably bound up with
its political message of challenging heterosexual normativity, we may
use the performative and the political interchangeably almost as if they
were synonymous (the performative expression discussed herein is politi-
cal and the political is performative.)' 36
The term "performativity" was first used in academic study by the
linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin 137 who distinguished performative lan-
guage from merely descriptive language. Austin asserted that performa-
tive language "indicates that the issuance of the utterance is the
performing of an action - it is not normally thought of as just saying
something." ' 38 Examples include the agreement to marry as performed
by the words "I do"'139 or the transference of ownership of a thing as
performed by the words "I bequeath" in a will. 140  Each of these
performative phrases not only describes the act in question but actually
does the act in the sense that, without the utterance, the act would be
incomplete or impossible. Such performances signify what people do
because we as a society have already accepted the performances as natu-
ral, separate and apart from the performer or the performance; that is,
when the groom says "I do," it means something because it has meant
something in the past.' 4' Other philosophers tell us that the meaning we
attach to performative language and the reason we perform it derives
from the self as socially constructed through institutions such as the legal
system, religion and the family. 142
Judith Butler has applied these ideas specifically to the construction
of gender identity, noting that "gender" is an act in the same way that
134 See supra note 105, at 90.
135 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
136 The linkage of these two concepts is not uncommon and even appears in the title of a
previously cited Judith Butler work. See supra note 83. See also JOSE ESTEBAN MUNOZ,
DISIDENTIFICATIONS: QUEERS OF COLOR AND THE PERFORMANCE OF POLITICS (1999).
137 J.L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WrrH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisd eds., 2d
ed. 1975).
138 Id. at 6-7.
139 Id. at 12-13.
140 Id. at 5.
141 JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED, INC. (Alan Bass trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1988)
(1972).
142 Chinn, supra note 133, at 297-98 (describing the work of Louis Althusser and Michel
Foucault).
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performative language is a speech act.' 43 Each individual generally per-
forms the "gender" assigned to him or her at birth (e.g. "it's a girl") in a
seemingly natural way but in reality, there is "no subject underneath the
gender, no universal self. Rather, the self is constructed through its
strenuous performance of gender." 144 The performances of the gendered
"male" and "female" continually replicate heterosexuality as the societal
norm.145 Therefore, when homosexuals contradict these normative per-
formances, as when drag queens misperform their gender 46 for example,
they are exposing gender as a construction. 147 Similarly, homosexual
marriage ceremonies expose heterosexual marriage as a convention de-
signed to reinforce the heterosexual norm.' 48 I would argue that this
performative aspect extends beyond gay marriage ceremonies and per-
formances in drag. Virtually every public act of an openly gay or lesbian
individual that is done in deliberate acknowledgement and celebration of
that person's same-sex orientation149 constitutes a performance that sub-
verts heteronormativity and is, therefore, the very type of speech the First
Amendment was most designed to protect. Such performances "can be
experienced as an attack on the subject; baldly speaking, it makes people
uncomfortable and they don't like it."150 Thus, identifying oneself as a
homosexual and performing that identity in an open and self-conscious
manner is without question a political statement.
143 Butler, supra note 133, at 25 ("There is no gender identity behind the expressions of
gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the 'expressions' that are said to be its
results.")
144 Chinn, supra note 133, at 300.
145 Id.
146 Jose Esteban Munoz would call such performances "disidentifications." See supra
note 136, at 5-8.
147 Chinn, supra note 133, at 300-01 ("By performing gender in a hyperbolic, stylized
way, drag queens don't simply imitate femininity, they reveal how women imitate femininity
as well, and what hard work it is. Through parody, drag can expose the seeming naturalness
and effortlessness of gender itself; it doesn't imitate an original, but reveals that there is no
original, only layers of performance. Drag says, 'If you think my pretending to be a woman is
hard, think what an effort it must be for a woman to do."').
148 Chinn is careful to point out the ways in which such performances designed to subvert
the heterosexual norm also reinforce it. For example, when the clearly "butch" man dresses in
drag, he might appear ridiculous, thus reinforcing the notion that men are not "supposed" to
act in that manner. Id. at 301.
149 Obviously, not every act of a homosexual's life is a performance protected by the First
Amendment. For example, no gay or lesbian individual could reasonably pronounce the
brushing of his or her teeth in the morning to be a constitutionally protected political perform-
ance of homosexuality. However, the political/performative model has tremendous potential
to expand the range of homosexual speech and conduct that is perpetrated in deliberate defi-
ance of the heterosexual norm. Brushing one's teeth does not constitute a counter-perform-
ance to the heterosexual norm but kissing a same-sex partner in public certainly does.
15o Chinn, supra note 133, at 301-02.
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Since political speech is accorded the greatest degree of deference
by the judiciary,' 5' recognition of homosexual expression as political
speech would alter the outcomes of many of the cases discussed above.
For example, those instances where the First Amendment claims of
homosexuals were disregarded on the basis that "mere status does not
constitute expression"' 52 would clearly be untenable in a judicial system
that recognized homosexual status itself as a form of constitutionally pro-
tected political speech. Further, the application of the political/performa-
tive model would invalidate cases that have acknowledged a
homosexual's right to be homosexual but not the right to draw attention
to that status where doing so would offend the sensitivities of the com-
munity. 53 Political speech is protected under the First Amendment re-
gardless of whether it offends. 154 Thus, forcing a gay or lesbian person
to cover his or her homosexuality by abstaining from its public expres-
sion would no longer be constitutionally permissible.
Even conduct, which has traditionally been granted less constitu-
tional protection than pure speech,' 55 would have to be safeguarded if
characterized as political. The constructed distinction between homosex-
ual conduct and homosexual speech, used to uphold the military's "don't
ask/don't tell" policy,' 5 6 would thus disintegrate if homosexual conduct
was revealed as a form of political expression - a counter-performance to
the expected gender norms scripted by society. If, as Professor Tribe
argues, the First Amendment protects conduct closely linked with ex-
pression, 57 then surely conduct that is itself synonymous with the ex-
pression must be protected under the First Amendment. Distinctions
between "pure speech" and "conduct" simply no longer matter when the
self-identifying actions of gays and lesbians are recognized as political
expression.
The potential ramifications of a judiciary willing to fully embrace
the concept of lesbian and gay expression as political/performative are
quite significant. For example, courts might begin to realize that, if ho-
mosexual conduct is a constitutionally protected form of political expres-
sion, then anti-sodomy laws must be invalidated.' 58 Of course, the
151 See supra notes 106-121 and accompanying text.
152 Tester v. City of New York, No. 95 Civ. 7972 (LMM) 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1937
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1997). See supra note 112.
153 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
154 See supra notes 106-121 and accompanying text.
t55 See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
158 Indeed, since some commentators have gone so far as to suggest an equation between
the act of sodomy and homosexual identity, anti-sodomy laws would have to be struck down
under a theory that protected homosexual identity as political speech. See Janet E. Halley,
Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA L.
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Supreme Court has, rather recently, refused to recognize anti-sodomy
laws as unconstitutional, 59 and it is unlikely to invalidate statutes
prohibiting sodomy in the short term. But, hopefully, in the near future,
more courts will at least acknowledge that speech describing the homo-
sexual lifestyle cannot be banned as obscene;' 60 that an interest in dis-
couraging homosexual relations cannot be deemed an adequate basis for
censoring homosexual speech;' 6' and that in general, "performing" one's
homosexual identity should be a constitutionally protected form of politi-
cal expression.
Of course, to ask the judiciary to protect speech that has hitherto
been characterized as too private, 62 too obscene, 163 too conduct-ori-
ented 64 or too something-else-other-than-speech 65 to warrant First
Amendment protection, is to ask the legal system to shed biases against
homosexual expression that have inspired it to shut down gay and lesbian
speech in the past. If we do not believe the judiciary would be willing to
do this when applying Brent Hunter Allen's "reasonable homosexual"
standard, why should we expect they might agree to do so in applying an
expansive conception of the political/performative test? 66 While it
would be naive enough to think that the majority of the bench will cast
off their homophobic blinders immediately upon being told that we all
"perform" our gender and that the counter-performances of the homosex-
ual community must therefore be viewed as a form of political protest,
there is good reason to hope that some will because some already have.
REv.1721, 1737 (1993) ("Sodomy in these formulations is such an intrinsic characteristic of
homosexuals, and so exclusive to us, that it constitutes a rhetorical proxy for us.").
159 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) ("[R]espondent would have us announce,
as the Court of Appeals did, a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we
are quite unwilling to do.").
160 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 53 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 109.
163 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (Ninth Circuit case that characterized as
obscene an article describing a woman's experience as a lesbian, equating it with "cheap
pornography.").
164 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (cases upholding homosexual ouster
from the military as constitutional because based on conduct rather than statements acknowl-
edging homosexual orientation).
165 See, e.g., supra note 112 (case holding that sexual status alone does not constitute
constitutionally protected expression).
166 Allen would likely disagree with my approach as yet another attempt to "bombard the
courts with images of homosexuality" until the majority finally recognizes it as an acceptable
form of expression. He finds this distasteful because it "mirrors and reasserts the majoritarian
process" and because it takes too long to achieve. Brent Hunter Allen, supra note 37, at 1103.
However, as mentioned above, I believe that his proposal too requires the approval of the
majority in order to be effective. Until (if ever) a true subjective standard for homosexual
expression can be implemented, I believe my proposal stands a better chance of being em-
braced more quickly by a judiciary so firmly steeped in traditional modes of First Amendment
analysis.
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Recall the District Court of Rhode Island's designation of a same-sex
public date as constitutionally protected political expression.1 67 Recall
the Western District of Oklahoma's refusal to stamp out the "artistic ex-
pression" represented by a national contest of female impersonators de-
spite the fact that the event might "be an open expression of
homosexuality" in violation of "community standards."' 168 Recall the
District of Maryland's ruling that a homosexual teacher's profession of
homosexual status is a "constitutionally protectable interest."' 169 In short,
unlike the application of the "subjective/objective hybrid" standard, there
is already valid precedent in support of the proposition that homosexual
expression is protected political/performative speech under the First
Amendment. Therefore, I propose that future litigants force an expanded
application of such precedent by arguing more often and more explicitly
that gay and lesbian expression is political/performative in nature. This
is not pushing the envelope of "free speech" jurisprudence so much as
simply asking the judiciary to return to the corners of the envelope it has
already explored.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment is one of the most powerful legal tools availa-
ble to disfavored, dissenting voices of this country. It has been used to
protect neo- Nazi demonstrations, 70 racist and anti-Semitic speech at Ku
Klux Klan rallies, 17' political acts that serve as statements such as the
burning of the American flag, 172 and the burning of crosses on the lawns
of African-Americans.' 73 Speech is power. Extending expanded consti-
tutional protection to homosexual expression means granting gays and
lesbians that power and acknowledging them as part of the "human com-
munity"' 74 whose contributions to the marketplace of ideas are worthy of
167 Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381, 385 (D.R.I. 1980). See supra note 114 and accom-
panying text.
168 Norma Kristie, Inc. v. Oklahoma City, 572 F. Supp. 88, 90 (W.D. Okla. 1983). See
supra note 54.
169 Acanfora v. Board of Ed., 359 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D.Md. 1973). See supra note 113.
Recall also that when a court did try to apply something similar to Hunter Allen's proposed
standard, the second circuit immediately overturned it. See supra note 78 and text (In holding
"don't ask, don't tell" as unconstitutional, Judge Nickerson for the Eastern District of New
York said "a court should ask itself what it might be like to be a homosexual.").
170 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
171 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
172 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
173 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
174 RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? HATE SPEECH,
PORNOGRAPHY AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT 141 (1997) (Speaking of civil rights and
feminist activists, the authors state the following: "The leaders of the reform movements just
mentioned were asking for more than better treatment in material respects for certain people or
things. They were also asking that terms like human, creature, decent, good, nice, precious,
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respect, the same respect we already accord to racists, hate-mongers, and
anti-patriots. Securing this respect need not require the special treatment
of a new judicial standard. No new rules of the game need be devised,
for the existing rules are more than sufficient to safeguard the First
Amendment rights of gays and lesbians. Litigants need only show the
judiciary what a few of their number have already conceded, that the
existing protections for political and performative speech must be ex-
tended more broadly to cover more forms of homosexual expression.
and worthy of respect apply to them. In short, they were asking for membership in the human
community. Respectful speech ...indicates the degree to which we accept that person's
humanity.").
